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ABSTRACT 
A correspondence is observed between a class of n-person 
cooperative games and production functions with fixed, discrete 
factor inputs. This correspondence motivates a simple way of 
valuing the players (or factors): the players, or factor re- 
presentatives, set prices on themselves in the face of a market 
of buyers. A noncooperative price-setting game results for 
which equilibrium prices always exist. Interpreted as a cooper- 
ative game it always has a core, which reduces to the core of 
the original aame if the latter is nonempty. This concept was 
originally applied to the problem of determining'the- relative . 
value of the players in a voting game when a market exists for 
their votes. 

The Market Value o f  a  Game 
Cons ider  a  c o o p e r a t i v e  game, by which w e  mean a  group o f  
i n d i v i d u a l s  whose coope ra t i on  can produce v a l u a b l e  r e s u l t s .  The 
p o t e n t i a l  ' v a l u e '  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  p o s s i b l e  subgroups o f  i n d i v i d -  
u a l s  i s  assumed known. A fundamental  2roblem i s  how t o  a t t r i b u t e  
v a l u e  t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  based on t h e i r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  c o a l i t i o n s .  
I t  i s  customary t o  t r e a t  t h i s  problem a x i o m a t i c a l l y ,  r egard-  
i n g  t h e  game a s  an  e n t i t y  complete i n  i t s e l f ,  p layed  i n  i s o l a t i o n  
from t h e  rest of  t h e  u n i v e r s e  [ 4 , 7 ] .  Doubt less  t h i s  i s  a  con- 
v e n i e n t  and reasonab ly  c o r r e c t  assumption f o r  many t y p e s  o f  games. 
However, t h e r e  i s  a  l a r g e  c l a s s  o f  games, i n c l u d i n g  f o r  example 
many 'economic'  t y p e s  o f  games, f o r  which t h i s  approach i s  i n -  
a p p r o p r i a t e .  These games a r e  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t h e  f e a t u r e  t h a t  
t h e  p l a y e r s '  a c t i o n s  f r e q u e n t l y  have v a l u e  t o  a g e n t s  outside t h e  
game and t h i s  v a l u e  i s  complete ly  t r a n s f e r a b l e .  
Examples o f  such games abound. A c l a s s i c  i n s t a n c e  would b e  
any c o o p e r a t i v e  agreement among a  group o f  i n d i v i d u a l s  t o  produce 
goods f o r  an  e x t e r n a l  market  by a  d i v i s i o n  o f  l a b o r .  A second 
example i s  t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  p roduc t i on  by o l i g o p o l i e s .  Y e t  a  t h i r d  
i s  t h e  c l a s s  o f  poZiticaZ games, i n  which a l l o c a t i o n  d e c i s i o n s  
t o  o u t s i d e  i n t e r e s t  groups  a r e  made by c e r t a i n  c o a l i t i o n s  o f  
d e c i s i o n  makers. The l a t t e r  i s  an example o f  a  s i t u a t i o n  where 
t h e  p l a y e r s '  ( i . e . ,  t h e  p o l i t i c i a n s ' )  a c t i o n s  a c t u a l l y  have no 
d i r e c t  v a l u e ,  i n  and o f  themselves ,  t o  t h e  p l a y e r s  a t  a l l :  
r a t h e r ,  t h e y  have v a l u e  on ly  t o  t h e  c o n s t i t u e n t s ,  who a r e  ou t -  
s i d e  t h e  game. Of cou r se ,  t h e s e  c o n s t i t u e n t s  may i n  t u r n  be  
w i l l i n g  t o  compensate t h e  p l a y e r s  f o r  t h e i r  a c t i o n s .  
.- 
I t  w i l l  be  shown t h a t  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  an e x t e r n a l  market  
f o r  a  game has  d i r e c t  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  way t h e  p l a y e r s  can  
be  va lued .  The r ea son  is  t h a t  under  v a r i o u s  v a l u a t i o n s  t h e r e  
w i l l  b e  an  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  o u t s i d e r s  t o  buy c o n t r o l  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  
s u b s e t s  o f  p l a y e r s  on which p r o f i t s  can b e  made. 
I f  t h e  c o r e  o f  t h e  game e x i s t s ,  and i f  t h e  p l a y e r s  a c t  co- 
o p e r a t i v e l y ,  t h e n  t h e y  can be c o n s i s t e n t l y  v a l u e d  by any imputa-  
t i o n  i n  t h e  c o r e ,  and o u t s i d e  a g e n t s  w i l l  n o t  be a b l e  t o  make any 
p r o f i t s .  I f  t h e  c o r e  does  n o t  e x i s t ,  however, t h e n  t h e  p l a y e r s  
canno t  o b t a i n  t h e  whole v a l u e  of  t h e  game i n  t h e  f a c e  of a  market .  
Assuming t h a t  t h e  p l a y e r s  c o o p e r a t e ,  e x a c t l y  enough p r o f i t s  w i l l  
be skimmed o f f  by e n t r e p r e n e u r s  t o  a l l o w  a  c o r e  t o  e x i s t  on what 
i s  l e f t  o v e r .  I f  t h e  p l a y e r s  a c t  n o n c o o p e r a t i v e l y ,  t h e n  even more 
may be skimmed o f f  i n  p r o f i t s .  I n  o t h e r  words,  t h e  non- 
e x i s t e n c e  of  t h e  c o r e  of  a  game means t h a t  p o s i t i v e  p r o f i t s  can 
be made by e n t r e p r e n e u r s ,  and t h a t  s t r u c t u r a l l y  t h e r e  i s  a  p o s s i -  
b i l i t y  f o r  e x p l o i t a t i o n .  
These r e s u l t s  a p p l y  n o t  o n l y  t o  t h e  c l a s s  of  games mentioned 
above,  b u t  t o  v i r t u a l l y  any p r o d u c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  w i t h  d i s c r e t e  
f a c t o r  i n p u t s .  F u r t h e r ,  w h i l e  it would be  p o s s i b l e  t o  t r e a t  t h e  
e x t e r n a l  market  a s  a  p a r t  o f  an ' e n l a r g e d '  game, a  good d e a l  o f  
f l e x i b i l i t y  i s  s a c r i f i c e d  i n  s o  doing:  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  r o l e  of  t h e  
game a s  p r o d u c t i o n  a c t i v i t y  i s  obscured ,  and o t h e r  i m p o r t a n t  con- 
n e c t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  o u t s i d e  u n i v e r s e  such a s  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s  a r e  
a l s o  l o s t .  A more f r u i t f u l  approach i s  t o  f o c u s  on t h e  game a s  
t h e  e n t i t y  of  i n t e r e s t  w i t h o u t  f o r g e t t i n g  t h e  market  "environment" 
t h a t  c o n d i t i o n s  i t s  b e h a v i o r .  
L e t  v  b e  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f u n c t i o n  o f  a  c o o p e r a t i v e  n- 
pe r son  game i n  which p a y o f f s  a r e  made t o  t h e  p l a y e r s  by a g e n t s  
o u t s i d e  t h e  game i n  r e t u r n  f o r  v a l u a b l e  a c t i o n s  t h e  p l a y e r s  
perform. The se t  o f  p l a y e r s  w i l l  b e  deno ted  by N = { 1 , 2 ,  ..., n ) .  
v  i s  assumed t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  two p r o p e r t i e s :  
v ( S )  2 - ~ ( $ 1  = 0 f o r  a l l  SC_N , 
v  (S u T )  2 - v  (S)  + v  (T) whenever S  n T = - 
v may be thought  of  a s  a  produc t ion  f u n c t i o n  whose f a c t o r  
i n p u t s  a r e  t h e  p l a y e r s .  I n  t h e  language of  p roduc t ion  theo ry ,  
cond i t i on  ( 1 )  a l lows  f r e e  d i s p o s a l ,  and c o n d i t i o n  ( 2 )  a l lows  
j o i n t  p roduc t ion .  
Conversely,  v i r t u a l l y  any produc t ion  a c t i v i t y  whose i n p u t s  
a r e  d i s c r e t e  i n  n a t u r e  can formal ly  be desc r ibed  by such a  pro- 
duc t ion  f u n c t i o n  v. I f  each f a c t o r  is  thought  of a s  be ing  
"represented ' '  by a  p l a y e r  ( f o r  example, i t s  owner) ,  then a  co- 
o p e r a t i v e  game i s  de f ined .  This  e s t a b l i s h e s  a  correspondence 
between coope ra t ive  games and d i s c r e t e  p roduc t ion  f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  
has  important  consequences. 
Example 1 .  (Team R e c r u i t m e n t )  
An .example of a  team rec ru i tmen t  problem i s  t h e  fol lowing:  
a t h l e t i c  managers a r e  t o  r e c r u i t  teams from a  d r a f t  pool of  
p l a y e r s  i n  a  s p o r t .  Each p o t e n t i a l  team has  a  box o f f i c e  va lue  
depending on t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  composing it. The va lue  of  two 
teams taken t o g e t h e r  i s  a t  l e a s t  t h e  sum o f  t h e i r  va lues  taken 
s e p a r a t e l y .  
Another example would be  t h e  r ec ru i tmen t  of performing 
a r t i s t s  by booking agents .  Consider t h e  fo l lowing  s imple  numer- 
i c a l  example. A n igh t - c lub  owner wants t o  h i r e  s i n g e r s  from a  
"pool" c o n s i s t i n g  of a  soprano ( S )  , a l t o  (A)  , and a  c o n t r a l t o  ( C )  . 
The va lues  of t h e  d i f f e r e n t  combinations o f  p l a y e r s  a r e  
Example 2 .  ( J o i n t  Resource Use)  
Four c o u n t r i e s  A , B , C , D ,  borde r  a  s e a  t h a t  can be  e x p l o i t e d  
f o r  commercial f i s h i n g .  Each may e s t a b l i s h  c o n t r o l s  on over-  
f i s h i n g  w i t h i n  i t s  own t e r r i t o r i a l  wa te r s ;  however, because o f  
in te rdependenc ies ,  coope ra t ion  i n  s e t t i n g  c o n t r o l s  l e a d s  t o  
g r e a t e r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  i n  t h e  t o t a l  s i z e  of t h e  c a t c h .  Let  v(Y) 
r e p r e s e n t  t h e  monetary v a l u e  t h a t  a  s e t  Y o f  c o u n t r i e s  can o b t a i n  
by s e t t i n g  p o l i c i e s  t o g e t h e r :  
These examples a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  simple;  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  
produc t ion  func t ion  v  may i n  r e a l i t y  be  extremely complicated 
combina to r i a l l y ,  r e f l e c t i n g  complex s u b s t i t u t i o n  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
between t h e  f a c t o r s .  Hence t h e  r e l a t i v e  va lue  o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  i s  
no t  a t  a l l  obvious.  I n  f a c t ,  it w i l l  t u r n  o u t  t h a t  t h e r e  may be  
a  m u l t i p l i c i t y  of v a l u a t i o n s  of t h e  f a c t o r s ;  n e v e r t h e l e s s  d e f i n i t e  
bounds can b e  placed on t h e  r eg ion  w i t h i n  which a l l  economically 
p l a u s i b l e  v a l u a t i o n s  must f a l l .  
Two approaches may b e  taken.  The f i r s t  a l lows  t h e  market 
p a r t i c i p a n t s  o u t s i d e  t h e  game t o  s e t  p r i c e s  by b idd ing  on t h e  
f a c t o r s .  The second views t h e  e x t e r n a l  market a s  responding t o  
p r i c e s  t h a t  a r e  s e t  by t h e  p l aye r s .  The l a t t e r  approach only 
makes sense  of course  i f  t h e  f a c t o r s  r e a l l y  a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  by 
agen t s  who can a c t  t o  s e t  p r i c e s ;  i n  o t h e r  words, i f  t h e  produc- 
t i o n  f u n c t i o n  r e a l l y  i s  a  "game" r a t h e r  than  a  c o l l e c t i o n  of mute 
f a c t o r s .  
I t  i s  t h e  second approach t h a t  w i l l  be  adopted i n  t h i s  paper.  
However it can be shown t h a t  a  n a t u r a l  b idd ing  model l e a d s  t o  
e x a c t l y  t h e  same va lues  a s  a r e  de r ived  h e r e ,  hence t h e  two ap- 
proaches a r e  compatible [ 101 . 
Given v ,  l e t  p - = ( p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n )  2 - 0  - b e  a h y p o t h e t i c a l  set  
o f  p r i c e s  f o r  t h e  p l a y e r s .  F o r  any  s u b s e t  S C N  t h e  p r o f i t  o f  S  
r e l a t i v e  t o  p  - i s  v ( S )  - s Pi' I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  empty set  a l -  
ways y i e l d s  z e r o  p r o f i t .  1 )  
The e x t e r n a l  m a r k e t  w i l l  b e  t r e a t e d  i n  t h e  s k e t c h i e s t  o f  
t e r m s .  I t  may c o n s i s t  o f  o n e ,  s e v e r a l ,  o r  many a g e n t s ,  who re- 
spond t o  p r i c e s  set  by t h e  p l a y e r s .  Only o n e  a s s u m p t i o n  i s  made 
r e g a r d i n g  t h e  m a r k e t :  
( 3 )  Market  P o s t u l a t e .  For any  g i v e n  p r i c e s  p  - t h e  s e t  
o f  p l a y e r s  b o u g h t  c o n s t i t u t e s  a maximum p r o f i t  s e t .  
T h i s  a s s u m p t i o n  i s  c e r t a i n l y  p l a u s i b l e  i f  t h e r e  i s  o n l y  one  
b u y e r .  I f  t h e r e  are s e v e r a l  b u y e r s ,  t h e y  c a n  b e  t h o u g h t  o f  as 
a r r i v i n g  a t  t h e  p u r c h a s e  window i n  some o r d e r ,  a n d  a s i m i l a r  
outcome o b t a i n s .  O t h e r  m a r k e t  models  s u p p o r t i n g  t h i s  h y p o t h e s i s  
c a n  e a s i l y  b e  imag ined .  
COOPERATIVE MARKET VALUE 
L e t  t h e  p l a y e r s  i n  t h e  game p r o p o s e  some d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e i r  
j o i n t  p r o c e e d s .  What i s  t h e  maximum amount t h e y  c a n  o b t a i n ?  
Suppose  f o r  example  t h a t  t h e  t r i o  p r o p o s e s  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
T h i s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  e f f e c t i v e l y  e s t a b l i s h e s  p r i c e s  f o r  t h e  
v a r i o u s  p l a y e r s .  A m a r k e t  v i e w i n g  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  w i l l  see t h a t  
e a c h  of  t h e  t h r e e  duos  c o n s t i t u t e s  a  mos t  p r o f i t a b l e  se t  ( t h e  
p r o f i t  b e i n g  $33 1 /3  f o r  e a c h ) ,  w h e r e a s  t h e  t r i o  would  y i e l d  z e r o  
p r o f i t .  Hence one  o f  t h e  duos  w i l l  b e  h i r e d ,  a n d  some p l a y e r  
w i l l  b e  e x c l u d e d .  Bu t  t h e n  t h e  p l a y e r s  w i l l  n o t  o b t a i n  t h e  f u l l  
$1000,  so t h e  p r o p o s e d  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i s  i n f e a s i b l e .  
Of cour se ,  i t  might be argued,  t h e  p l a y e r s  could a c t  a s  a  
c o a l i t i o n  and simply i n s i s t  t h a t  they must a l l  be bought t o g e t h e r  
o r  no t  a t  a l l .  Then they  would r e c e i v e  $1000, and could s p l i t  
it a s  proposed. Unfor tunately  t h e r e  i s  a  very s t r o n g  i n c e n t i v e  
f o r  such a  c o a l i t i o n  t o  break up, s i n c e  any duo would be b e t t e r  
o f f  by o f f e r i n g  t o  d e f e c t  ( f o r  a  bonus) and t h e  market agen t s  
might w e l l  t r y  t o  induce them t o  do so .  
The conclusion i s  t h a t  i f  t h e  t r i o  has  any hope of o b t a i n i n g  
$1000, they cannot s p l i t  i t  i n  t h i s  way. 
In  g e n e r a l ,  l e t  X ,  , x 2 , .  . . ,xn be a  proposed d i s t r i b u t i o n  t o  
t h e  c o a l i t i o n  N.  A s  viewed by t h e  market ,  t h e  amounts xi con- 
s t i t u t e  e f f e c t i v e  p r i c e s  f o r  t h e  p l aye r s .  Hence N w i l l  only  be 
a b l e  t o  o b t a i n  t h e  amount E x  i f  t h e  s e t  of p l a y e r s  bought con- 
N i 
t a i n s  a l l  p l a y e r s  i such t h a t  xi > 0. Thus t h e r e  must be a  
maximum p r o f i t  s e t  T wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  x such t h a t  xi = 0 f o r  i F T .  
* 
I f  q  i s  t h e  p r o f i t  from T I  then 
f o r  a l l  S - C N  . 
However, xi = 0 f o r  i y T  imp l i e s  
s o  e q u a l i t y  ho lds  i n  ( 5 )  and N i s  a l s o  a  maximum p r o f i t  set wi th  
r e s o e c t  t o  x. 
- 
The maximum amoun t  N can o b t a i n  i s  t h e r e f o r e  q* ,  where q* 
i s  an optimum t o  t h e  l i n e a r  program 
(6 min q  
s u b j e c t  t o  q  + 1 pi L v ( S )  
-
S 
f o r  a l l  S  
Here p  h a s  been i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  x .  Note t h a t  q* 1 0  by 
- - 
- 
v i r t u e  o f  t h e  i n e q u a l i t y  w i t h  S  = @. 
I t  i s  e a s i l y  seen  t h a t  ( 6 )  always ha s  an o p t i m a l  s o l u t i o n ,  
s i n c e  q  = v ( N ) ,  p  = 0  i s  f e a s i b l e  and q  i s  c l e a r l y  bounded below. 
- - 
Any op t i ma l  s o l u t i o n  p* - t o  ( 6 )  w i l l  b e  c a l l e d  a  c o o p e r a t i v e  m a r k e t  
v a l u e  f o r  v. A c o o p e r a t i v e  market  v a l u e  r e p r e s e n t s  a  d i s t r i b u -  
t i o n  t o  t h e  p l a y e r s  t h a t  y i e l d s  a  maximum t o t a l  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  
p l a y e r s  i n  t h e  p r e s en ce  o f  a  market  which p r o v i d e s  t h e  p a y o f f s .  
I f  t h e  game v  has  a  c o r e ,  t h e n  t h e  minimum v a l u e  o f  q  is  z e r o ,  
and t h e  c o o p e r a t i v e  market  v a l u e s  a r e  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  
i n  t h e  c o r e .  Thus t h e  c o o p e r a t i v e  market  v a l u e  concep t  g e n e r a l -  
i z e s  t h e  c o r e  i n  a  n a t u r a l  way. 
I n  Example 1  t h e  unique c o o p e r a t i v e  market  v a l u e  i s  
p; = $600, p i  = $200, pE = $100, and t h e  market  a b s o rbs  $100 i n  
pure  p r o f i t s .  I n  t h i s  s ens e  t h e  p l a y e r s  can be  e x p l o i t e d  by a  
booking a g e n t ,  n i g h t c l u b  owner, o r  o t h e r  e n t r e p r e n e u r .  
Of c o u r s e ,  f o r  t h e  p l a y e r s  t o  a c t u a l l y  r e c e i v e  t h e s e  amounts,  
a l l  of  them must b e  bought .  But each  duo a l s o  y i e l d s  a s  much 
p r o f i t  a s  t h e  t r i o ,  $100. What a s s u r e s  t h a t  t h e  market  w i l l  buy 
t h e  t r i o  i n s t e a d  o f  some duo a t  t h e s e  p r i c e s ?  The answer i s  
t h a t  t h e  p l a y e r s  c o u l d  r e c e i v e  t h e s e  amounts; moreover t h e y  can 
a l l  a s s u r e  themselves  of  up  t o  t h e s e  amounts,  s i n c e  i f  a l l  "shade"  
t h e i r  p r i c e s  by a  s m a l l  amount E ,  t h e n  Is ,A,c)  w i l l  be  t h e  u n i q u e  
most p r o f i t a b l e  se t  a s  viewed by t h e  market .  
I n  g e n e r a l  f o r  any game v ,  i f  a l l  p l a y e r s  w i t h  p o s i t i v e  co- 
o p e r a t i v e  market  v a l u e s  " shade"  t h e i r  p r i c e s  by a  s m a l l  amount E ,  
t h e n  a l l  a r e  c e r t a i n  o f  be ing  bought .  Hence t h e  c o o p e r a t i v e  
market  v a l u e  can a l s o  be  i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  a  l i m i t i n g  d i s t r i b u t i o n  t o  
t h e  p l a y e r s  t h a t  i s  independen t  o f  how t h e  market  r e s o l v e s  a  " t i e . "  
One can s i m i l a r l y  ask  how much any s u b c o a l i t i o n  C c N  c ou ld  
o b t a i n  ( i n  t h e  l i m i t )  by a  s u i t a b l e  p r i c i n g  o f  i t s  members. For 
C t o  be  a b l e  t o  g u a r an t ee  i t s e l f  an amount a ,  it must b e  t r u e  
t h a t  no m a t t e r  what p r i c e s  a r e  asked  by t h e  p l a y e r s  n o t  i n  C ,  C 
w i l l  be  c o n t a i n e d  i n  some maximum p r o f i t  set  and r e c e i v e  t h e  
amount a .  - More p r e c i s e l y ,  C can gua ran t ee  i t s e l f  a i f  t h e r e  i s  
C C C N-C 
a  I C I - v e c t o r  p 2 C l ,  pi = a ,  such t h a t  f o r  any p r i c e s  p .., 1 - 0  - 
quoted by t h e  p l a y e r s  i n  N -  C ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  maximum p r o f i t  set 
T r e l a t i v e  t o  p  - = ( p C I p N - C )  - wi th  CfiT p i  = a .  
The maximum amount C can o b t a i n  i n  t h i s  way i s  denoted  by 
v * ( C ) ,  and t h e  n-person game v* s o  d e f i n e d  i s  c a l l e d  t h e  c o o p e r -  
a t i v e  s e l l - o u t  game. It  can t hen  be,shown t h a t  
e v e r y  c o o p e r a t i v e  m a r k e t  v a l u e  f o r  v  i s  i n  t h e  c o r e  o f  v*. 
Th i s  r e s u l t ,  which i s  a  s p e c i a l  c a s e  o f  Theorem 2  below, 
s a y s  t h a t  no c o a l i t i o n  can ,  by any p r i c i n g  p o l i c y ,  gua ran t ee  
i t s e l f  more than  it g e t s  under  t h e  p r i c e s  r e p r e s e n t e d  by a  co- 
o p e r a t i v e  market va lue .  Combined w i t h  t h e  e a r l i e r  o b s e r v a t i o n s  
about  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between c o o p e r a t i v e  market  v a l u e s  and t h e  
co re  o f  v ,  it a l s o  i m p l i e s  t h a t  
t h e  c o r e  o f  v* i s  a l w a y s  nonempty ,  and c o n t a i n s  t h e  c o r e  o f  v. 
It w i l l  a l s o  b e  shown (Theorem 2 )  t h a t  w h i l e  t h e  c o r e  o f  v* 
may c o n t a i n  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  c o o p e r a t i v e  market  
v a l u e s ,  none of t h e s e  meet t h e  t es t  o f  be ing  a  "noncoopera t ive  
equ i l i b r i um"  ( t o  be  d e f i n e d  below) and t h e r e f o r e  a r e  n o t  v i a b l e .  
I n  t h e  t r i o  game of Example 1 ,  c o n s i d e r  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  o f  
t h e  soprano  (S)  and t h e  a l t o  ( A ) .  I f  both  have p o s i t i v e  p r i c e s ,  
'A > 0 ,  t h e n  Is ,A) w i l l  be  con t a ined  i n  a  maximum p r o f i t  set  
when C c h a r g e s  pC on ly  i f  
t h a t  i s ,  
The min max (pS + pA) i s  a c h i e v e d  when p .= 600,  and  pA = 200. S  
> o  P ~ I P ~ > O  PC= 
Thus v*(S ,A)  = $800.  Now t h e  maximum amount t h a t  t h e  s i n g l e t o n  
set  {s )  c a n  g u a r a n t e e  i t s e l f  i s  a t  most  v ( S )  = $ 8 0 ,  s i n c e  o t h e r -  
w i s e  t h e  o t h e r s  m i g h t  c h a r g e  s o  much t h a t  o n l y  t h e  empty se t  
y i e l d s  a  n o n n e g a t i v e  p r o f i t .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  w i t h  pS = $80 
none o f  t h e  sets  4 ,  { A ) ,  { c ) ,  {A,c) c a n  y i e l d  a h i g h e r  p r o f i t  
t h a n  d o e s  {S ,A,C) ,  h e n c e  v * ( S )  = $80. By t h i s . t y p e  o f  r e a s o n i n g  
w e  f i n d  t h a t  
v* ( $ 1  = 0  
v * ( S )  = 80 V* (S,A) = 800 
v* ( A )  = 50 v* (S IC)  = 700 
I n  t h i s  case t h e  c o o p e r a t i v e  m a r k e t  v a l u e  p* = (600 ,200 ,100)  i s  
- 
t h e  u n i q u e  v e c t o r  i n  t h e  core o f  v*. 
NONCOOPERATIVE MARKET VALUE 
If t h e  core o f  t h e  o r i g i n a l  game v  i s  empty ,  it c a n  e a s i l y  
b e  imagined  t h a t  t h e  p l a y e r s  w i l l  n o t  c o o p e r a t e  a t  a l l ,  b e c a u s e  
t h e r e  i s  n o t  enough economic g l u e  t o  h o l d  s e l f - o r g a n i z e d  c o a l i -  
t i o n s  t o g e t h e r .  T h i s  d o e s  n o t  mean, however ,  t h a t  t h e  b e n e f i t s  
t h e  p l a y e r s  c a n  p r o d u c e  by j o i n t  a c t i o n  w i l l  b e  l o s t .  It  s i m p l y  
means t h a t  c o a l i t i o n s  w i l l  b e  o r g a n i z e d  f rom t h e  o u t s i d e  by 
e n t r e p r e n e u r s .  Under t h i s  r eg ime  p r o d u c t i o n  i s  e f f i c i e n t - -  t h e  
maximum p o s s i b l e  v a l u e  v(N)  w i l l  b e  p roduced .  Fo r  t h e i r  s e r v i c e s ,  
however ,  t h e  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  e x t r a c t  a p r o f i t .  T h i s  p r o f i t  i s  
n e c e s s a r i l y  p o s i t i v e  i f  t h e  game h a s  no  core; i n  f a c t ,  it  may b e  
v e r y  l a r g e .  The minimum p r o f i t  t h a t  w i l l  b e  e x t r a c t e d  i f  t h e  
p l a y e r s  coopera te  i n  s e t t i n g  t h e i r  p r i c e s  i s  t h e  op t imal  q* of 
( 6 ) .  This  va lue  w i l l  be c a l l e d  t h e  e x t r a c t a b l e  value of t h e  
game, and denoted ,by  q * ( v ) .  I t  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  minimum amount 
t h a t  must be skimmed o f f  of each c o a l i t i o n ' s  va lue  f o r  t h e  
co re  t o  come i n t o  e x i s t e n c e .  
I f  t h e  p l a y e r s  do n o t  coopera te  ,. , t hen  even g r e a t e r  p rof  i t s  
may be e x t r a c t e d .  However t h e  p o s s i b l e  p r i c e s  t h a t  can ho ld  
even i n  t h i s  s e t t i n g  a r e  q u i t e  r e s t r i c t e d .  I n  f a c t ,  we s h a l l  
show t h a t  t h e  a t t empt s  o f  t h e  p l a y e r s  t o  f i n d  t h e i r  most ad- 
vantageous p r i c e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  o t h e r s '  ha s  an e q u i l i b r i u m  
outcome. 
Define t h e  " p r i c e - s e t t i n g "  game a s  fo l lows .  For any pos- 
s i b l e  p r i c e s  p  l e t  f ( p )  be  t h e  maximum p r o f i t  s e t  t h a t  i s  ac tu -  
- - 
a l l y  bought a t  t h e s e  p r i c e s .  Typ ica l ly  t h e r e  i s  on ly  one such 
s e t  f o r  a  g iven  p ,  however f  s e r v e s  a s  a  t i e -b reak ing  r u l e . i f  
- 
t h e r e  is  more than  one maximum p r o f i t  s e t .  The f u n c t i o n  f  i s  
c a l l e d  a  market schedule .  Some s p e c i f i c a t i o n  of  f  i s  necessary  
f o r  t h e  p r i c e  s e t t i n g  game t o  be wel l -def ined ,  and it t u r n s  ou t  
t h a t  t h e r e  always is  some choice  o f  f  t h a t  y i e l d s  a  p r i c e  equi-  
l ib r ium.  Happily,  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e s  and p a y o f f s ,  i f  t hey  
do e x i s t ,  do n o t  depend on which p a r t i c u l a r  f  t hey  come from. 
Define t h e  noncooperat ive  s e l l - o u t  game f o r  a  g iven  f  t o  
be t h e  game whose p l a y e r  s e t  i s  N ,  and i n  which a  s t r a t e g y  of  
p l a y e r  i i s  t o  name a  nonnegat ive  r e a l  number pi ( h i s  p r i c e ) ;  
t h e  payoff t o  i given  t h e  s t r a t e g y  p  = (p,  rp2 , .  . . ,pn)  is t hen  
- 
i f  i E f  (p )  
- 
A p r i c e  v e c t o r  p  2 0 i s  a  s t r o n g  noncooperat ive  equ i l i b r ium 
- - - 
( h e r e a f t e r  c a l l e d  simply an equ i l i b r ium)  and ( p , f )  i s  an equi -  
- 
l ib r ium p a i r  i f  t h e r e  i s  no s e t  of p l a y e r s  t h a t  can change p r i c e s  
i n  such a  way t h a t  each r e c e i v e s  a  h ighe r  payoff  t han  b e f o r e ,  
assuming t h a t  none of t h e  o t h e r  p l a y e r s  changes p r i c e  [ 11 . That 
i s ,  
t h e r e  i s  no nonempty C C N  - such t h a t  
p i  = pi for  a l l  i E C  , 
$ i ( p ' r f )  - > Oi(e , f )  f o r  a l l  i E C  . 
The c l a s s  of  a l l  e q u i l i b r i a  i s  e a s i l y  c h a r a c t e r i z e d .  Le t  
go = { s - C N : v (S) = max) be t h e  family  of  maximum va lue  s e t s ,  
c a l l e d  c r i t i c a l  s e t s .  By assumption,  N i s  a  c r i t i c a l  s e t .  The 
0 
c r i t i c a l  p l a y e r s  N a r e  t h e  p l aye r s  conta ined  i n  every c r i t i c a l  
s e t :  N O  = nS . 
s@ 
For any p r i c e  v e c t o r  p  d e f i n e  p, t h e  n o r m a l i z a t i o n  of  p ,  
- - - 
a s  fol lows:  
= 0 otherwise  . 
p i s  normal i f  p = p. 
- - - 
Theorem 1 .  Any game v has an e q u i l i b r i u m  p r i c e  v e c t o r  p; 
- 
moreover p 1 0  i s  an e q u i l i b r i u m  and q t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  
- - - 
e x t r a c t e d  p r o f i t ,  i f  and o n l y  i f  
(iil q + 1 pi = v(T)  f o r  some c r i t i c a l  set T C N  - , 
T 
(iii) f o r  every p l aye r  k t h e r e  e x i s t s  
These cond i t i ons  s ay  t h a t  p  i s  an e q u i l i b r i u m  i f  t h e  
- 
maximum p r o f i t  q  i s  r e a l i z e d  on some c r i t i c a l  s e t  T and T remains 
a  maximum p r o f i t  s e t  (wi th  t h e  same p r o f i t  q )  even when a l l  non- 
c r i t i c a l  p l a y e r s  quote  a  p r i c e  of ze ro ;  f u r t h e r ,  no p l a y e r  i s  i n  
every maximum p r o f i t  se t .  The l a t t e r  c o n d i t i o n  i s  c l e a r l y  neces-  
s a r y ,  e l s e  some p l a y e r  cou l d  r a i s e  h i s  p r i c e  f u r t h e r .  
I f  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  a ccep t ed  f o r  t h e  moment a s  s u f f i c i e n t ,  
it i s  ea s y  t o  see why an e q u i l i b r i u m  e x i s t s ,  and how t o  c o n s t r u c t  
one. Beginning w i t h  p r i c e s  and some c r i t i c a l  p l a y e r  k ,  r a i s e  
- 
h i s  p r i c e  t o  t h e  p o i n t  where h e  i s  n o t  con t a ined  i n  some maximum 
p r o f i t  se t ,  and do t h i s  s u c c e s s i v e l y  f o r  a l l  o f  t h e  c r i t i c a l  
p l a y e r s .  I n  a  f i n i t e  number o f  s t e p s ,  c o n d i t i o n  (iii) must be  
s a t i s f i e d .  A t  t h i s  p o i n t  t h e  c o n s t r u c t e d  p r i c e  v e c t o r  p  s a t i s -  
.., 
- 
f i e s  pi = pi = 0 f o r  a l l  n o n c r i t i c a l  i ,  and by c o n s t r u c t i o n  a l l  
c r i t i c a l  sets a r e  maximum p r o f i t  sets,  s o  c o n d i t i o n s  (i)-(iii) 
a r e  s a t i s f i e d  and p  i s  an equ i l i b r i um.  (Th is  does n o t  imply o f  
.., 
c o u r s e  t h a t  all e q u i l i b r i a  may be  c o n s t r u c t e d  i n  t h i s  way.) 
T h i s  theorem i s  a  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n  o f  r e s u l t s  i n  [ 81 f o r  s imple  
games, and t h e  proof  t h a t  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  nece s sa ry  and s u f -  
f i c i e n t  i s  g iven  i n  t h e  Appendix. Here w e  n o t e  s e v e r a l  c o r o l -  
l a r i e s .  
The c o n d i t i o n s  imply t h a t  i n  any maximum p r o f i t  set S  a l l  
n o n c r i t i c a l  p l a y e r s  have z e r o  p r i c e .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  no m a t t e r  
what f  i s ,  a l l  n o n c r i t i c a l  p l a y e r s  w i l l  r e c e i v e  z e r o  payo f f .  
Fur thermore ,  if S* i s  t h e  set  o f  p l a y e r s  s o l d  and T t h e  maximum 
p r o f i t  c r i t i c a l  se t  gua ran t eed  by c o n d i t i o n  (ii), t h e n  any p l a y e r  
i n  T - S* w i t h  a  positive p r i c e  cou ld  lower  h i s  p r i c e  and improve 
h i s  income. Hence a l l  p l a y e r s  i n  T - S* must have z e r o  p r i c e ,  
which i m p l i e s  S* is  a l s o  a  c r i t i c a l  se t .  T h i s  shows t h a t  i n  
e q u i l i b r i u m  t h e  payoff  t o  any p l a y e r  i i s  p r e c i s e l y  Fi. 
Corollary 1.1: ( p , f )  is a n  equilibrium pair iff p  satisfies 
.., .., 
(i)-(iii) a n d  f  (p)  is a critical set. 
.., 
Corollary 1.2: For any equilibrium price vector p, .., the 
equilibrium payoffs are 5. .., 
Corollary 1.3: I f  p  - is a n  equilibrium then so is p. 
.., 
C o r o l l a r i e s  1 .2  and 1 . 3  s a y  t h a t  t h e  payoff  v e c t o r  from any 
e q u i l i b r i u m  set  of  p r i c e s  is i t s e l f  a  normal e q u i l i b r i u m .  Any 
normal e q u i l i b r i u m  w i l l  be  c a l l e d  a  n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  marke t  v a l u e  
f o r  v .  
Theorem 2 .  Every c o o p e r a t i v e  marke t  va lue  i s  a  noncoopera-  
t i v e  marke t  v a l u e ;  i n  f a c t ,  t h e  s e t  o f  c o o p e r a t i v e  marke t  
v a l u e s  i s  p r e c i s e l y  t h e  s e t  o f  n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  marke t  v a l u e s  
c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  c o r e  o f  v*. 
The p roof  i s  g iv en  i n  t h e  Appendix. 
The f i s h i n g  r i g h t s  game (Example 2)  ha s  a  one-point  c o r e  
c o n s i s t i n g  o f  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  ( .6 ,4 ,3 ,2)  t o  p l a y e r s  A , B , C , D  re- 
s p e c t i v e l y .  Th i s  v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  p l a y e r s  i s  b o t h  a  c o o p e r a t i v e  
and a  noncoopera t ive  market  v a l u e  f o r  t h e  game and t h e  c o r r e -  
sponding e x t r a c t a b l e  p r o f i t  i s  zero .  However, t h e r e  a r e  non- 
c o o p e r a t i v e  market  v a l u e s  n o t  i n  t h e  c o r e .  The r e a d e r  may v e r i f y  
t h a t  each  o f  t h e  v a l u a t i o n s  ( 8 - x , 2 + x , 3 , x )  where 0 5 - x  < 2  i s  a  
noncoopera t ive  market  v a l u e  y i e l d i n s  a  p r o f i t  o f  2 - x  u n i t s  t o  
t h e  marke t .  
OPPORTUNITY COSTS 
I n  t h e  s e l l - o u t  game, i f  a  p l a y e r  i s  n o t  bought  he  g e t s  
no th ing .  Th i s  i s  b ecau s e ,  by assumpt ion,  v a l u e  can o n l y  b e  ob- 
t a i n e d  th rough  i n t e r med ia ry  a ge n t s .  Thus, i f  t h e  p l a y e r s  i n  a  
f o o t b a l l  d r a f t  p o o l  a r e  n o t  h i r e d  by a  team, t h e y  g e t  no th ing ;  
i f  a  f i s h i n g  f l e e t  does  n o t  buy a  l i c e n c e  t o  f i s h  i n  t h e  terri- 
t o r i a l  w a t e r s ,  t h e  co u n t ry  g e t s  no th ing ;  i f  t h e  s i n g e r  i s  n o t  
c o n t r a c t e d  by t h e  n i g h t - c l u b  owner, he  g e t s  no th ing .  
T h i s  assumption i g n o r e s ,  however, t h e  t r u e  r e l a t i o n  between 
t h e  p l a y e r s  i n  t h e  game and t h e  u n i v e r s e  o u t s i d e  t h e  game: i n  
r e a l i t y ,  each  p l a y e r  o r  f a c t o r  has  an  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  o f  b e i n g  
employed i n  t h e  game v  a s  opposed t o  do ing  something else. The 
maximum v a l u e  o f  do ing  something else e s t a b l i s h e s  a  f l o o r  p r i c e  
0 p .  L 0 f o r  each  p l a y e r  i i n  t h e  game. Thus i f  t h e  f o o t b a l l  
1 - 
p l a y e r  o r  s i n g e r  i s  n o t  r e c r u i t e d ,  h e  can g e t  a n  a l t e r n a t i v e  job  
o r  c o l l e c t  unemployment compensat ion;  i f  t h e  c o u n t r y ' s  c o a s t a l  
w a t e r s  a r e  n o t  e x p l o i t e d  f o r  f i s h i n g  t h e y  cou ld  be  used f o r  
0 
example f o r  was te  dumping. The o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s  p  a r e  add i -  
... 
t i o n a l  d a t a  o f  t h e  problem n o t  s p e c i f i e d  i n  t h e  game v;  however, 
t h e s e  c o s t s  must b e  i n c l u d e d  i n  r e a l i s t i c  a p p l i c a t i o n s .  
0 The p r e v i o u s  t h e o r y  d e a l t  w i t h  t h e  "pu re "  c a s e  p  = 0 .  The 
- ... 
r e s u l t s  g e n e r a l i z e  i n  a s t r a i g h t - f o r w a r d  manner t o  t h e  c a s e  of  
0 
an a r b i t r a r y  p 2 - 0. However, d i r e c t  connec t i ons  w i t h  t h e  c o r e  
... 
g e n e r a l l y  do n o t  s u r v i v e ,  e x c e p t  i n  t h e  c a s e  whe re  t h e  oppor tu-  
n i t y  c o s t  o f  each  p l a y e r  i i s  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  v ( i )  . 
0 Given p , t h e  c o o p e r a t i v e  s e l l - o u t  v a l u e  v*(C) o f  a  c o a l i t i o n  
... 
C C N  i s  t h e  s u m  o f  i t s  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s  p l u s  t h e  maximum a d d i -  
t i o n a l  amount it can o b t a i n  by some d i s t r i b u t i o n  o v e r  and above 
t h e s e  c o s t s .  
Now a  c o a l i t i o n  C can o b t a i n  an  amount a? i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  i t s  
o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s  i f  t h e r e  i s  a  d i s t r i b u t i o n  xi 2 0 f o r  a l l  ~ E C  
C o N-C o  such t h a t  f o r  pi = x  + pi and any f e a s i b l e  p r i c e s  p  2 p j  de- i j 
manded by t h e  o t h e r  p l a y e r s ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  maximum p r o f i t  se t  T 
C N-C 
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  ( p  , p  
... 
) w i t h  x = a?. cm i 
For  any d i s t r i b u t i o n  x  = (x , ,  ..., x n )  which y i e l d s  a  maximum 
- 
f o r  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  N ,  x + p0 = p  w i l l  b e  c a l l e d  a  c o o p e r a t i v e  
... 
marke t  v a l u e  f o r  v  r e l a t i v e  t o  
... 
A c r i t i c a l  s e t  r e l a t i v e  t o  i s  any s e t  which y i e l d s  max- 
- 
i m u m  p r o f i t s  when p r i c e s  a r e  The c r i t i c a l  p l a y e r s  N o  a r e  
- 
t h o s e  con t a ined  i n  e v e r y  c r i t i c a l  set .  A p r i c e  v e c t o r  p  i s  normal 
... 
i f  p  = p where 5 i s  d e f i n e d  by 
- ... ... 
I f  x  + = p  i s  a  c o o p e r a t i v e  market  v a l u e  t h e n  f o r  some T 
... ... - 
0 
q = v ( T )  - I P  2 v ( S )  - l p i  f o r  a l l  S  and pi = pi f o r  a l l  i 9 T .  
T 1 -  S  
Hence 
0 O for all^ . V ( T )  - Epi  - xi 2 v ( S )  - Lpi 
T T-S S  
I f  S  i s  c r i t i c a l ,  t h e n  e q u a l i t y  must ho ld .  Hence maximum p r o f i t s  
0 a r e  a t t a i n e d  on a l l  c r i t i c a l  sets ,  and pi = pi f o r  a l l  n o n c r i t i c a l  
p l a y e r s .  
0 The c o o p e r a t i v e  market  v a l u e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  p a r e  t h e r e f o r e  
- 
t h e  op t imal  s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  l i n e a r  program 
I 
(71 min q  
s u b j e c t  t o  
0 0 0 e , p  w i t h p  = p i  f o r  i F N  , i 
f o r  a l l  
q  + 2 pi = v ( T )  f o r  a l l  c r i t i c a l  sets  T 
T 0 
wi th  r e s p e c t  t o  p  . 
- 
The optimum v a l u e  o f  ( 7 )  i s  c a l l e d  t h e  extractable value 
of t h e  game v  g iven  f l o o r  p r i c e s  C l e a r l y  an optimum always 
- 
e x i s t s .  
W e  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e s e  i d e a s  w i t h  t h e  " t r i o "  example. Suppose 
t h a t  each o f  t h e  s i n g e r s  can work i n s t e a d  a s  a  t y p i s t  and e a r n  
$250. The p r o f i t  from t h e  d i f f e r e n t  coalitions, n e t  of  opportu-  
n i t y  c o s t s ,  i s  
The unique c r i t i c a l  se t  i s  t h e  duo {s,A). I f  t h e  soprano 
and t h e  a l t o  r e c e i v e  premiums of  $300 and $100 r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  
t hen  {s,A) y i e l d s  a  n e t  p r o f i t  of  z e r o  and no o t h e r  set  y i e l d s  a  
p o s i t i v e  n e t  p r o f i t .  The re fo re  by ( 7 )  t h e  e x t r a c t a b l e  va lue  
i s  z e r o ,  and (550,350,250) i s  a  coope ra t i ve  market  v a l u e  f o r  v 
w i t h  t h e  g i v e n  f l o o r  p r i c e s .  T h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  u n i q u e  c o o p e r a t i v e  
m a r k e t  v a l u e ,  however .  The same a n a l y s i s  h o l d s  f o r  any  amounts  
x  and  xA s u c h  t h a t  xS + x  = 400,  xS 2 300,  xA 2 0. Hence t h e  S A 
c o o p e r a t i v e  m a r k e t  v a l u e s  form t h e  f a m i l y  { ( 6 5 0 -  xA, 250 + x A , 2 5 0 ) :  
0  5 - XA 2 1001. 
I f  e a c h  p l a y e r ' s  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  i s  t a k e n  t o  b e  v ( i ) ,  t h e n  
t h e  c o r e  o f  v  e x i s t s  if and o n l y  i f  t h e  e x t r a c t a b l e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  
game i s  z e r o ,  a n d  t h e  c o o p e r a t i v e  m a r k e t  v a l u e s  c o n s t i t u t e  p r e -  
c i s e l y  t h e  c o r e  o f  v .  
F o r  a r b i t r a r y  f l o o r  p r i c e s  2 0  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  
.-. - - 
n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  s e l l - o u t  game i s  g e n e r a l i z e d  as f o l l o w s .  The 
0 




a n d  f o r  any m a r k e t  s c h e d u l e  f ,  t h e  p a y o f f  i s  
. A n  e q u i z i b r i u m  means a s t r o n g  n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h i s  game. Theorems 1 a n d  2  and  t h e i r  c o r o l l a r i e s  
now g e n e r a l i z e  v e r b a t i m  w i t h  t h e  added  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  p  L 
.-. - .-. 
APPLICATION TO VOTING GAMES 
A l e g i s l a t u r e  is  a  n a t u r a l  example o f  a s i t u a t i o n  i n  which  
t h e  p l a y e r s '  a c t i o n s  d o  n o t  y i e l d  v a l u e  t o  t h e  p l a y e r s  d i r e c t l y , ,  
b u t  t o  i n t e r e s t  g r o u p s  o u t s i d e  t h e  game. The r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  
t h e  i n t e r e s t  g r o u p s ,  c a l l e d  l o b b y i s t s ,  v iew t h e  game as a pro-  
d u c t i o n  p r o c e s s  i n  which  t h e  o b j e c t  p r o d u c e d  i s  a d e c i s i o n ,  a n d  
t h e i r  o b j e c t  i s  t o  buy c o m b i n a t i o n s  o f  l e g i s l a t o r s  t h a t  y i e l d  a 
d e s i r e d  outcome. 
I n  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  v o t i n g  games o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t s  a l s o  a r i s e  
i n  a  n a t u r a l  way. The a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  s e l l i n g  o u t  i s  t o  " s t a y  
h o n e s t , "  which d o u b t l e s s  ( t o  most l e g i s l a t o r s )  h a s  a  p o s i t i v e  
v a l u e .  The f a c t  t h a t  t h i s  v a l u e  i s  p a r t i c u l a r  t o  t h e  l e g i s l a t o r  
and may b e  n o n t r a n s f e r a b l e  i s  o f  no impor tance :  a  f l o o r  p r i c e  
0 
> 0  i s  assumed g i v e n  f o r  each p l a y e r  a s  a  datum o f  t h e  problem. P i  = 
The v o t i n g  game v  i s  now i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  a  p r o d u c t i o n  func-  
t i o n  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  way. F o r  a  g i v e n  i s s u e  t h a t  some i n t e r e s t  
group wants  t o  have p a s s e d ,  e v e r y  l o s i n g  set  S h a s  z e r o  monetary 
v a l u e ,  w h i l e  e v e r y  winning set  T h a s  a  monetary v a l u e  v ( T )  = L ,  
where L i s  presumed t o  b e  " l a r g e "  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  p l a y e r s '  f l o o r  
p r i c e s .  If  L i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  l a r g e  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  p l a y e r s '  
f l o o r  p r i c e s  ( a  n o t  u n r e a s o n a b l e  p resumpt ion)  t h e n ,  u n l e s s  t h e r e  
i s  a  v e t o  p l a y e r ,  t h e  v a l u e  o f  L i s  i m m a t e r i a l  t o  t h e  de te rmina-  
t i o n  o f  e i t h e r  c o o p e r a t i v e  o r  n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  market  v a l u e .  T h i s  
i s  because  t h e  ?rice c e i l i n g  o f  a   laver i s  d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  s u b s t i t u t i n g  o t h e r  p l a y e r s  f o r  him, hence  u l t i m a t e l y  
on t h e  o t h e r s '  f l o o r  p r i c e s ,  n o t  on t h e  v a l u e  o f  L. 
Example 3.  C o n s i d e r  t h e  we igh ted  v o t i n g  game ( 3 , 1  , 1 , 1 , 1  , I )  
where a weigh ted  v o t e  o f  5 o r  more i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  win. L e t  e v e r y  
p l a y e r  have t h e  same f l o o r  p r i c e  > 0,  and l e t  t h e  v a l u e  o f  
eve ry  winning set  t o  a l o b b y i s t  b e  some l a r g e  number L. The 
c r i t i c a l  sets S a r e  t h o s e  o f  form { 3 , 1 , 1 ) ,  and p l a y e r  1 i s  t h e  
unique  c r i t i c a l  p l a y e r .  By Theorem 1 ,  t h e  normal  n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  
e q u i l i b r i a  a r e  t h e  s o l u t i o n s  p  t o  t h e  sys tem 
w 
(i) q  + l p i '  L f o r  a l l  winning sets S 
S 
(ii) q  + 1 pi = L f o r  a l l  c r i t i c a l  sets S 
S 
(iii) q  + 1 pi = L f o r  some winning se t  S n o t  
S c o n t a i n i n g  p l a y e r  1.  
S i n c e  o n l y  p l a y e r  1 i s  c r i t i c a l  pi = f o r  p l a y e r s  2  t o  6.  
Moreover, t h e  o n l y  winning s e t  not c o n t a i n i n g  p l a y e r  1 i s  
0 0 { 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ) ,  s o  by c o n d i t i o n s  (ii) and (i i i) ,  p,  + 2p = 5p , 
0 0 0 
whence p ,  = 3p . Thus p* - = ( 3 p 0 , p 0 , p 0 , p  , p  is  t h e  u n i q u e  
n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  marke t  v a l u e  (hence  it i s  a l s o  t h e  un ique  co-  
o  
o p e r a t i v e  market  v a l u e )  and market  p r o f i t s  a r e  q* = L ' -  5p . 
The i d e a s  o f  " c o o p e r a t i v e "  and " n o n c o o p e r a t i v e "  marke t  
v a l u e s  and f l o o r  p r i c e s  were f i r s t  i n t r o d u c e d  [ 8 ]  i n  t h e  con- 
text o f  v o t i n g  games under  t h e  names " c a n o n i c a l  e q u i l i b r i u m "  
and " s t r o n g  n o n c o o p e r a t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m "  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The o r i g -  
i n a l  m o t i v a t i o n  was t o  d e v e l o p  a measure o f  power w i t h  more 
economic c o n t e n t  t h a n  such v a l u e  c o n c e p t s  as t h e  Shapley-Shubik 
and Banzhaf measures .  I n  d e f i n i n g  power it w a s  a r g u e d  t h a t  it 
is  n o t  what  a p l a y e r  a s k s  b u t  what  h e  g e t s  t h a t  c o u n t s ,  hence  
t h e  p r o p e r  measure o f  h i s  power i s  n o t  h i s  p r i c e  b u t  h i s  e x p e c t e d  
p a y o f f .  I n  [ 8 ]  t h i s  w a s  i n t e r p r e t e d  t o  mean h i s  e x p e c t e d  b r i b e  
income under  c o o p e r a t i v e  market  v a l u e  p r i c e s ,  i . e .  h i s  e x p e c t e d  
b r i b e  income o v e r  a l l  e q u i l i b r i u m  p a i r s  ( p , f )  when P i s  a co- 
- 
o p e r a t i v e  marke t  v a l u e  and f  a market  s c h e d u l e .  I n  Example 3 ,  
t h e r e  a r e  1 0  c r i t i c a l  sets ,  each  o f  which migh t  b e  t h e  set bought  
i n  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  hence  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  any g i v e n  n o n c r i t i c a l  
p l a y e r  i s  b r i b e d  i s  2/5 and t h e  e x p e c t e d  b r i b e  incomes are 
(3p0,  2p0/5, 2p0/5, 2p0/5, 2p0/5, 2p0/5) . 
However, t h i s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i g n o r e s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  even i f  
a p l a y e r  i s  n o t  b r i b e d  h e  s t i l l  r e c e i v e s  an  i m p l i c i t  p a y o f f - -  
h i s  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t .  The p r e s e n t  model i n c l u d e s  o p p o r t u n i t y  
c o s t s  i n  t h e  payof f  f u n c t i o n  and l e a d s  t o  t h e  more s a t i s f a c t o r y  
r e s u l t  t h a t  p r i c e  and payof f  are t h e  same -- a t  least f o r  a l l  
"normal" p r i c e s .  
I n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  a v e t o  p l a y e r - - t h a t  i s ,  a p l a y e r  which 
i s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  e v e r y  winning c o a l i t i o n - - t h e  t o t a l  v a l u e  L o f  
t h e  winning c o a l i t i o n s  t o  t h e  l o b b y i s t  e n t e r s  e x p l i c i t l y ,  s i n c e  
t h i s  v a l u e  i s  t h e  o n l y  e f f e c t i v e  c e i l i n g  on t h e  p r i c e  o f  s u c h  a 
p l a y e r .  ( I n  [ 8 ]  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  winning sets w a s  assumed t o  b e  
i n f i n i t e  and e q u i l i b r i u m  w a s  n o t  d e f i n e d  f o r  t h i s  case.) To see 
t h e  e f f e c t  of a  ve to  p l aye r  cons ider  t h e  same example a s  above 
but  with a  quota  of 6 requi red  t o  win. Then p l a y e r  1 i s  a  ve to  
p l a y e r ,  t h e  unique noncooperative market va lue  i s  
and market p r o f i t s  a r e  zero.  
This  model of vo te  buying holds  whether t h e r e  a r e  one, 
s e v e r a l  o r  many l o b b y i s t s  t r y i n g  t o  o b t a i n  c o n t r o l  of t h e  v o t e r s .  
However, it may w e l l  happen t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  l o b b y i s t s  on oppos i t e  
s i d e s  of an i s s u e - -  one t r y i n g  t o  buy vo tes  f o r ,  t h e  o t h e r  a g a i n s t .  
In  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  t h e  p resen t  model does n o t  always apply ,  s i n c e  
it i s  pred ica ted  on t h e  assumption of a  uniform market i n  which 
a l l  buyers perce ive  t h e  same product ion func t ion .  This  w i l l  be 
t h e  case  f o r  two opposing l o b b y i s t s  only i f  t h e  winning c o a l i t i o n s  
a r e  t h e  same a s  t h e  blocking c o a l i t i o n s  ( i . e . ,  only i f  t h e  vo t ing  
game i s  d e c i s i v e ,  l i k e  simple major i ty  r u l e ) .  Various s p e c i a l  
bidding mechanisms have been i n v e s t i g a t e d  f o r  t h e  case  of two 
opposing l o b b y i s t s  [ 5 , 6 , 9 ] .  
RELATION TO OTHER VALUES 
The  receding argument has  shown t h a t  i n  t h e  f a c e  of a  market, 
t h e  p l aye r s  of a  game wi th  t r a n s f e r a b l e  va lue  may n o t  be a b l e  t o  
d i s t r i b u t e  t o  themselves t h e  whole va lue  of  t h e  game (un les s  t h e  
game has a  c o r e ) .  This  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  t h e  concept of market va lue  
from a  number of o t h e r  va lue  concepts.  (The i d e a  t h a t  t h e  p l aye r s  
should be a b l e  t o  d i s t r i b u t e  t h e  whole va lue  of  t h e  game goes 
back t o  von Neumann and Morgenstern 171.) Here w e  c o n t r a s t  t h e  
market va lue  wi th  s e v e r a l  o t h e r  value concepts  us ing  t h e  " t r i o "  
example, and show how t h e  l a t t e r  f a i l  t o  s a t i s f y  c e r t a i n  simple 
market t e s t s .  
The unique c o o p e r a t i v e  (and noncoopera t ive )  market  v a l u e  
f o r  t h e  t r i o  i s  (600,200,100)  and it i s  assumed t h a t  a l l  t h r e e  
s i n g e r s  a r e  h i r e d .  C l e a r l y  no s i n g e r  w i l l  do b e t t e r  by a sk ing  
l e s s ,  and i f  any t r ies  t o  g e t  more, on ly  h e r  r i v a l s  w i l l  be h i r e d  
and s h e  w i l l  go begging.  Moreover, $900 i s  t h e  maximum t h a t  a l l  
can g e t  under  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s .  
Cons ider  by c o n t r a s t  t h e  Shapley v a l u e  f o r  t h i s  game: (495,  
280, 225) .  Th i s  v a l u a t i o n  w i l l  n o t  s t a n d  i n  t h e  p r e sence  o f  re- 
c r u i t e r s  ( i . e .  n i g h t  c l u b  owners) because  c e r t a i n  s u b c o a l i t i o n s  
y i e l d  more p r o f i t  t h a n  t h e  whole c o a l i t i o n .  The unique most 
p r o f i t a b l e  c o a l i t i o n  under  t h e s e  p r i c e s  i s  t h e  s o p r a n o - a l t o  duo, 
w i t h  a  p r o f i t  o f  $125. I n  t h e s e  c i r cums t ances  one o f  two t h i n g s  
must happen; e i t h e r  t h e  p r i c e s  o f  S and A w i l l  rise,  o r  t h e  p r i c e  
of  C w i l l  f a l l  ( o r  b o t h ) .  Moreover t h i s  c o n c l u s i o n  f o l l o w s  wi th-  
o u t  p o s t u l a t i n g  any c o o p e r a t i v e  behav io r  on t h e  p a r t  o f  t h e  p lay-  
ers, s o  t h e  Shapley v a l u e  f a i l s  t h e  tes t  o f  noncoopera t ive  p r i c e  
e q u i l i b r i u m .  
A second v a l u e  c o n c e p t ,  t h e  g e n e r a l i z e d  ~ a n z h a f  v a l u e  ( s e e  
[ 2 , 3 ] )  i s  based  on  a  p r o b a b i l i s t i c  a ssessment  by each  p l a y e r  of  
h i s  v a lue  i n  j o i n i n g  an  e x i s t i n g  c o a l i t i o n .  I f  S  i s  a  c o a l i t i o n  
and i & S t h e n  t h e  v a l u e  o f  i j o i n i n g  S  i s  v  ( S  u { i )  ) - v  (S) . I f  
a l l  p r i o r  c o a l i t i o n s  S C . ( N -  { i ) )  a r e  e q u a l l y  l i k e l y  w e  o b t a i n  t h e  
Banzhaf  v a l u e  o f  i: 
The sum of  t h e  v a l u e s  may be  more o r  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  "va lue  
of  t h e  whole, " v  ( N )  . 
The Banzhaf v a l u e s  f o r  Example 1 a r e  ( B S , B G I B O )  = (572.5.  
357.5, 3 0 2 .5 ) .  These  a r e  i m p l a u s i b l e  a s  market  v a l u e s  f o r  t h e  
s imple  reason  t h a t  a l l  nonempty sets y i e l d  a  n e g a t i v e  p r o f i t .  
Another f r e q u e n t l y  used  v a l u e  concep t  i s  t h e  l e a s t  c o r e  and 
a  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n  t h e r e o f ,  t h e  n u c l e o l u s .  The l e a s t  c o r e  i s  an 
a l l o c a t i o n  x 0  t o  t h e  p l a y e r s  such t h a t  t h e  whole amount v(N) 
- - .-d 
i s  d i v i d e d ,  and t h e  e x c e s s  p r o f i t  p o s s i b l e  from any s u b c o a l i t i o n  
i s  a  minimum, t h a t  i s  
min q  
These c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  ve ry  c l o s e  t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  
c o o p e r a t i v e  market  v a l u e ,  e x c e p t  f o r  t h e  c r u c i a l  assumpt ion 
(iii) t h a t  t h e  p l a y e r s  must r e c e i v e  t h e  whole v a l u e  o f  t h e  game. 
Un fo r tu na t e ly ,  t h i s  s imp le  d i f f e r e n c e  l e a d s  t o  a  v a l u e  which 
a l s o  f a i l s  t o  s a t i s f y  t h e  t e s t  o f  noncoopera t ive  market  equ i -  
l i b r i u m .  
The l e a s t  c o r e  f o r  t h e  t r i o  c o n s i s t s  o f  t h e  s i n g l e  imputa- 
t i o n  (pS,pA,pC) = (633 1/3 ,  233 1/3,  133 1 / 3 ) .  There  a r e  t h r e e  
most p r o f i t a b l e  sets: {S ,A) ,  ( S I C ) ,  and ( A , c ) .  However, o n l y  
one o f  them w i l l  be bought - -which  one depends on a d d i t i o n a l ,  
u n s p e c i f i e d  f a c t o r s .  Whether t h e  c h o i c e  is  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  o r  
p r o b a b i l i s t i c ,  however, some p l a y e r  w i l l  always be  a b l e  t o  q u o t e  
a  s l i g h t l y  l o w e r  p r i c e  and t h u s  make s u r e  t h a t  he  i s  b r i b e d  w i t h  
c e r t a i n t y ,  i n  o t h e r  words t o  i n c r e a s e  h i s  e x p e c t e d  i ncome .  So 
t h e  p l a y e r s  -- a c t i n g  i n d e p e n d e n t l y - - w i l l  be  b o t h  mo t iva t ed  and 
a b l e  t o  u p s e t  t h i s  a l l o c a t i o n :  it f a i l s  t h e  t e s t  o f  noncoopera- 
t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
CONCLUSION 
I n  summary, i f  t h e  a c t i o n  o f  p l a y e r s  i n  a  c o o p e r a t i v e  game 
has  v a l u e  t o  agen t s  o u t s i d e  t h e  game, a  market  f o r  t h e  game may 
b e  c r e a t e d  t h a t  c o n d i t i o n s  t h e  p l a u s i b l e  v a l u a t i o n s  t h a t  can b e  
p l a c e d  on t h e  p l a y e r s .  The p l a y e r s  a r e  assumed t o  p l a c e  v a l u e s  
on themse lves  and t h e  market  responds .  I f  t h e y  do s o  noncooper- 
a t i v e l y ,  t hen  s t r o n g  equ i l i b r ium p r i c e s  o r  va lues  can be shown 
t o  e x i s t .  But even i f  they  s e t  t h e i r  va lues  coope ra t ive ly  they  
w i l l  n o t  be a b l e  t o  r e a l i z e  t h e  whole va lue  of t h e  game i f  t h e  
co re  i s  empty. T h i s  means t h a t ,  f o r  pu re ly  s t r u c t u r a l  r ea sons ,  
t h e  p l a y e r s  may be  e x p l o i t a b l e  by o u t s i d e  e n t r e p r e n e u r s .  
I t  i s  always p o s s i b l e ,  o f  cou r se ,  t o  en l a rge  t h e  o r i g i n a l  
game s o  a s  t o  i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e  market.  In t roduce  a  new f a c t o r  
"0" ( t h e  market)  and d e f i n e  t h e  game 6 on { 0 , l  , . . . , n )  by 6 (s) = 
v  (S - ( 0 ) )  i f  o E S, G ( s )  = 0 otherwise .  It  w i l l  t h e n  be  seen  t h a t  
t h e  coope ra t ive  and noncooperat ive  market va lues  a r e  p a r t i c u l a r  
imputat ions  i n  t h e  c o r e  of t h i s  augmented  game.  But t h e  a t tempt  
t o  encompass eve ry th ing  w i t h i n  a  game having l a r g e r  boundar ies  
obscures  important  f e a t u r e s  such a s  oppor tun i ty  c o s t s .  The game 
t h e o r e t i c  appara tus  i s  more u s e f u l  when it is  employed f l e x i b l y  
t o  b r ing  i n t o  sharp  focus  c e r t a i n  t ypes  of i n t e r a c t i o n s  w i thou t  
f o r g e t t i n g  t h e  l a r g e r  system i n  which they  a r e  embedded. Here 
t h i s  approach was used t o  focus  on t h e  p l a y e r s  r a t h e r  than  t h e  
market agen t s ;  e x a c t l y  t h e  oppos i t e  approach could b e  taken  i n  
which p r i c e  format ion i n  t h e  market i s  modelled i n  d e t a i l .  It  
may be shown, however [101, t h a t  t h i s  approach a l s o  l e a d s  t o  
p r e c i s e l y  t h e  va lue  concepts  desc r ibed  here .  
APPENDIX 
Proof of Theorem 1 .  
The e x i s t e n c e  of an equ i l i b r ium has  a l r e a d y  been noted i n  
t h e  t e x t  f o r  p  = 0 and t h e  argument i s  s i m i l a r  f o r  gene ra l  P o -  
- - - 
Sufficiency of t h e  Conditions 
0 Let p  2 p  s a t i s f y  cond i t ions  (i) - (iii) of Theorem 1 .  By 
- - - 
(ii) t h e r e  i s  a  c r i t i c a l  s e t  T t h a t  i s  a l s o  a  maximum p r o f i t  s e t  
- 
r e l a t i v e  t o  p. Not ice  t h a t  (i) and (ii) imply pi = pi f o r  a l l  
- 
i E T .  Notice  f u r t h e r  t h a t  f o r  any c r i t i c a l  s e t  S* 
Thus 
- 
q  = v(S*)  - 1 pi f o r  a t 2  c r i t i c a l  s e t s  S* . 
S* 
Let f  be any market schedule  such t h a t  f ( p )  = T.  W e  w i l l  
- 
show t h a t  ( p , f )  is  an equ i l ib r ium p a i r  ( t h u s  a l s o  e s t a b l i s h i n g  
- 
h a l f  of Coro l la ry  1 . I  ) . 
If n o t ,  then f o r  some p '  2 d i f f e r i n g  from p  only  on a  
- - -  - 
nonempty c o a l i t i o n  C ,  w e  have 'Pi ( p '  , f )  > Yi ( p , f )  f o r  a l l  i € C. 
- - 
Hence f o r  T '  = f  ( p ' ) ,  
- 
- (1 0 )  P; > P i  = P i  f o r  a l l  ~ E C ~ T  , 
and 
(1 1 )  0 - -  p j > p i - p i  a l l i ~ C - T  . 
Now 
and 
S u b t r a c t i n g  ( 1  2 )  from (1 3) , 
- 
I - For  i E T  - C ,  pi - - pi - pi ,  SO (14)  can  b e  w r i t t e n  
- 
By (10)  and ( 1 1 ) ,  p!  > pi f o r  a l l  i E C ,  hence f o r  a l l  i E N .  1 = 
- 
S i n c e  T I  ? T n C ,  (15)  i m p l i e s  t h a t  p j  = pi f o r  a l l  i E  (TI - ( T f l C ) ) .  
- 
Thus p i  = pi f o r  a l l  i E  C - T, c o n t r a d i c t i n g  (1 1 )  u n l e s s  C - T  = $. 
Thus 
- 
(16)  C C T  n T '  and p j  = pi f o r  a l l  i E  TI - C . 
By h y p o t h e s i s  C # $; choose j EC. By (iii) t h e r e  is  a set 
S* such t h a t  j fz S* and q = v ( S * )  - l* pi. By (i) and t h e  f a c t  
- 




T h e r e f o r e ,  under  p r i c e s  p '  t h e  p r o f i t  o f  S* i s  
- 
However, t h e  p r o f i t  o f  TI i s  
which  i s  smaller,  s i n c e  j E C  - S* and p !  > pj. T h i s  c o n t r a -  
7 
d i c t i o n  t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  T '  e s t a b l i s h e s  t h e  s u f f i c i e n c y  o f  
t h e  c o n d i t i o n s .  
N e c e s s i t y  o f  t h e  C o n d i t i o n s  
0 L e t  p  L_ P b e  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  t h a t  i s ,  a s t r o n g  noncoopera-  
- 
t i v e  e q u i l i b r i u m  r e l a t i v e  t o  s o m e  s p e c i f i c  m a r k e t  s c h e d u l e  f .  
L e t  f ( p )  = T ,  and  q  = v ( T )  - ,$pi. 
- 
W e  show f i r s t  t h a t  T  i s  a 
c r i t i c a l  set  ( t h i s  w i l l ,  i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  p r o v e  t h e  o t h e r  h a l f  o f  
C o r o l l a r y  1 . I ) .  . 
0 E Suppose  n o t .  L e t  8 = { i  6 T  : pi > pi} ,  and  d e f i n e  p  s u c h  
- 
t h a t  
C o n s i d e r  a n  a r b i t r a r y  c r i t i c a l  set S*. 
i m p l i e s  
The two s i d e s  o f  t h i s  e x p r e s s i o n  c a n  b e  r e w r i t t e n  a s  
0 --t S i n c e  (PE - p . )  = E I S *  n T  1 ,  i t  f o l l o ~ ~ s ,  t h a t  f o r  a l l  
s*-T i 1 
s u f f i c i e n t l y  s m a l l  E > 0 ,  
E Therefore T i s  n o t  maximum p r o f i t  u n d e r  p . S j n w  T i s  
- .  
zaxF7.xa ~ Z O Z ~ Z  2- . ;>-- 2 a :  .\ d l i i a r s  rr.0111 p .  ~ 1 1 l y  on , i t  r - 
E follows t h a t  every maximum p r o f i t  s e t  S with r e s p e c t  t o  p  has 
w 
-k 
a nonempty i n t e r s e c t i o n  wi th  T . L e t  C ( C  # $ )  be a  minimal 
element of  t h e  fol lowing family,  ordered by i n c l u s i o n :  
WE = {S n !? : s i s  maximum p r o f i t  under , 
- 
and l e t  
where E i s  chosen SO smal l  t h a t  py  + E < pi f o r  a l l  i~ ?. In  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  p '  2 p E  with  > f o r  i~ !? - C .  Now t h e  maximum p r o f i t  
under p '  i s  t h e  same a s  under c a l l  it q ' .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
w w 
E f ( p l )  = S'  has  p r o f i t  q t  under both p '  and p . By choice of E ,  
- - 
S ' ~ T + ~ C .  By d e f i n i t i o n  of C ,  S ' n 3  = C.  Therefore  C C f ( p ' ) .  % 
But p '  i s  obta ined  from p when a l l  members of C reduce t h e i r  
w w 
0 p r i c e s  from pi t o  pi + E .  Moreover, t h e  payoff t o  i E C i s  i 
0 
under p  b u t  pi + E under p ' ,  s i n c e  C C f ( p t ) .  So p w a s  n o t  a  
w w - % - 
s t rong  noncooperative equi l ibr ium.  This c o n t r a d i c t i o n  e s t a b l i s h e s  
t h a t  T = f ( p )  must be a  c r i t i c a l  s e t .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  (ii) o f  
w 
Theorem 1 holds  f o r  T .  
With def ined  a s  above, t h e  argument beginning a t  (17) 
w 
shows t h a t  f o r  a l l  s u f f i c i e n t l y  small  E > 0 w e  must have 
E E 
v(..S) - 1 p .  5 V ( T )  - 1 pi = q f o r  a l l  s C N  . 
S I -  T 




0 Suppose t h a t  pk > pk - pk f o r  some ~ E T .  By d e f i n i t i o n  of  
- 
p ,  k  i s  n o t  c r i t i c a l ,  hence t h e r e  i s  a  c r i t i c a l  se t  S  such t h a t  
- 
k  $Z S. Then 
imp l i e s  
t h e  > s i n c e  pk > Sk - P: and kET-S.  T h i s  c o n t r a d i c t s  ( 1 8 ) ,  
- T - 
showing t h a t  pi = pi f o r  a l l  i E T I  hence p  = p. But t h e n  ( 1  8 )  
- .., 
i s  p r e c i s e l y  c o n d i t i o n  (i) of  t h e  theorem. 
F i n a l l y ,  c o n d i t i o n  (iii) i s  c l e a r l y  n e c e s s a r y ,  s i n c e  i f  a  
p l a y e r  w e r e  con ta ined  i n  e v e r y  maximum p r o f i t  s e t ,  he  cou ld  r a i s e  
h i s  p r i c e  and do b e t t e r .  17 
Proof of  Theorem 2 .  
L e t  p* be a  c o o p e r a t i v e  market  v a l u e  r e l a t i v e  t o  some g iven  
- 
f l o o r  p r i c e s  W e  show f i r s t  t h a t  p* i s  a l s o  a  noncooperat ive  
- . 
market  va lue .  
W e  know t h a t  p* i s  an op t ima l  s o l u t i o n  t o  ( 7 ) ,  hence p* i s  
-. -. 
- 
normal (p* = p*)  and maximum p r o f i t s  q* a r e  a t t a i n e d  on some 
- - 
c r i t i c a l  set .  
By Theorem 1  it remains on ly  t o  show t h a t  no p l a y e r  k  i s  
i n  e v e r y  maximum p r o f i t  set .  Such a  p l a y e r  k  would have t o  be 
c r i t i c a l ,  s i n c e  a l l  c r i t i c a l  sets  a r e  maximum p r o f i t .  But t hen  
p l a y e r  k ' s  p r i c e  cou ld  be i n c r e a s e d ,  c o n t r a d i c t i n g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
q* i s  a  minimum f o r  ( 7 ) .  
Next w e  show t h a t  p* i s  i n  t h e  c o r e  o f  v*. S i n c e  w e  have 
Cp+ = v*(N) by d e f i n i t i o n  o f  v*,  it remains  o n l y  t o  show t h a t  N 1 
1 p +  ? v * ( S )  f o r  a l l  S C N  . 
S 1 - 
Suppose t o  t h e  c o n t r a r y  t h a t  XpS < v * ( S )  f o r  some S. By d e f i n i -  S  1 
t i o n  o f  v* (S)  t h e r e  i s  an I S  I - v e c t o r  x  2 0  such t h a t  v* (s) = 
- - 
0 0 
; x i  f Cons ide r  t h e  p r i c e  v e c t o r  p '  - t h a t  e q u a l s  xi + pi 
on S  and pi on N - S. By d e f i n i t i o n  o f  v* (S)  t h e r e  i s  a  maximum 
p r o f i t  set  S '  r e l a t i v e  t o  p '  such t h a t  xi = 0  f o r  i E S  - S t .  I f  
- 
xk > 0 f o r  some k  E  S  - N O ,  t h e n  t h e r e  i s  a  c r i t i c a l  s e t  n o t  con- 
t a i n i n g  k ,  and under  p '  it w i l l  y i e l d  a  h i g h e r  p r o f i t  t h a n  s ' ,  
- 
a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  Hence xk = 0  f o r  a l l  k E S  - N O .  
0 Now c o n s i d e r  t h e  v e c t o r  p"  t h a t  e q u a l s  xi + pi on  S  and pf 
- 
on N - S. By t h e  p r e c e d i n g ,  
p i  = p f  f o r  a l l  i $ ! ~ f l ~ O  and 1 p i  > 1 ~f - 
snN0 snNO 
Again by d e f i n i t i o n  o f  v * ( S )  t h e r e  i s  a  maximum p r o f i t  set  
S" r e l a t i v e  t o  p"  such  t h a t  
- 
(20)  I' - 0 P i  - P i  f o r  a l l  i E S  - S" . 
Thus f o r  any c r i t i c a l  se t  T, 
whereas  
whence 
By ( 1 9 ) ,  p i  = p t  f o r  a l l  i E S "  - T, and by (20)  p i  - p I  2 0  1 
f o r  a l l  i E T - S" . Hence e q u a l i t y  h o l d s  i n  (21 ) - (23)  . I n  par-  
t i c u l a r ,  a l l  c r i t i c a l  sets a r e  maximum p r o f i t  sets under  p " .  - 
Thus ( q W r p " )  i s  f e a s i b l e  f o r  ( 7 ) .  But ( 1 9 )  imp l i e s  q" < q*,  a  
- 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  
Conversely,  l e t  p  be a  noncooperat ive  market va lue  i n  t h e  
- 
core  of v*. Then C p = v* ( N )  . Now v* ( N )  = C p* f o r  some o p t i -  - 
N i N 1 
ma1 s o l u t i o n  p* t o  t h e  l i n e a r  program ( 7 ) ;  moreover, from t h e  
- 
d e f i n i t i o n  of v* and t h e  f a c t  t h a t  p* i s  normal, v* ( T )  = $ p I  
r., 
f o r  every c r i t i c a l  s e t  T. Since  p  is assumed t o  be i n  t h e  c o r e  
- 
1 p .  2 V* ( T )  = 1 pf f o r  a l l  c r i t i c a l  T . 
T 1 - T 
Since  p  and p* a r e  normal, 
- - 
0 0 1 pi = 1 p i  + E P .  1 1 p i  + 1 ~ f  = Epf  
N N-T T N-T T N 1 - 
~ u t  C p  = C * = v * ( N ) ,  s o  a l l  i n e q u a l i t i e s  a r e  e q u a l i t i e s  
N i N P l  
i n  ( 2 4 )  and ( 2 5 ) .  Hence p  i s  a l s o  an op t imal  s o l u t i o n  t o  (71,  
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FOOTNOTE 
1 .  By p r o f i t  we mean pure  p r o f i t .  I f  t h e  oppor tun i ty  c o s t  of 
a l t e r n a t i v e  investment  i s  some p r o f i t  r a t e  IT > 0, t hen  t h e  pure  
p r o f i t  of a  s e t  S  of f a c t o r s  i s  v ( S )  - (1  + n )  g P i .  T h i s  s i t u a -  
t i o n  i s  t r e a t e d  by simply de f in ing  t h e  new game. ' v '  (S) = v ( S )  / 
( 1  + ~ r r )  f o r  each S  and proceeding a s  above. 
